Littera Scripta. Revista de Filosofía es una publicación afiliada al Departamento de Humanidades de la Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile, cuya fundación fue el año 2020. El propósito de nuestra publicación es, fundamentalmente, contribuir en la apertura de nuevos espacios de divulgación académica tanto nacional como internacional que permitan promover y consolidar las investigaciones de académicas(os) e investigadoras(es) de filosofía.
Universidad Andrés Bello. Facultad de Educación y Ciencias Sociales. Departamente de Humanidades
María Teresa Stuven & Miguel González. Jorge Eduardo Rivera: Textos Póstumos. Ediciones UC, 2025. ISBN: 9789561434257
Copyright (c) 2026 Cristóbal Palisson Krämer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Traducción del francés de Jorge Acevedo Guerra Publicado originalmente en Fédier, F. (2006d). La pensée de Kant. En L’art en liberté (pp. 139–165). Pocket.
Copyright (c) 2026 François Fédier; Jorge Acevedo Guerra https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
The Suffering Body as Territory of Power: Biopolitics, Precariousness and Alterity in the Experience of Street Dwellers in Santiago de Cali
What happens to the body of those who live on the street? This seemingly simple question calls for three simultaneous philosophical registers, none of which, taken separately, is sufficient to answer it. To this end, we propose to interpret the experience of fifteen street dwellers in Santiago de Cali, based on empirical materials produced through photovoice between 2020 and 2022, through the lens of biopolitics and the analytics of power in Michel Foucault, the ontology of precarity and the theory of grief in Judith Butler, and the phenomenology of alterity in Emmanuel Levinas. These frameworks are not applied sequentially; rather, they interrogate one another, as each reveals what the others do not fully capture. The central argument is as follows: the body of the street dweller operates as a territory of power—that is, as a surface upon which the mechanisms of urban exclusion are inscribed—yet that same body simultaneously constitutes a site of resistance, of meaning-making, and of irreducible ethical demand. The analysis shows how, in the voices and images of the participatory process—from Chapita’s “rotten apples” to Marcus’s “thank you for seeing me”—there converge the logic of biopolitical abandonment, the production of lives deemed ungrievable, and the ethical interpellation of the face of the Other: three dimensions of a single experience that only the articulation of these three frameworks renders intelligible. The conclusion is that a philosophically informed psychosocial intervention cannot dispense with any of these registers, and that photovoice operates not only as a methodological technique but also as a device that intervenes in the normative frameworks of visibility that urban biopolitics produces.
Copyright (c) 2026 Julián Andrés Casas Corrales https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Figures of Appearance: Richir between Husserl and Heidegger around the notion of phenomenon
This paper seeks to clarify Marc Richir’s notion of phenomenon, showing its originality in relation to the classical phenomenological tradition and highlighting his attempt to access “phenomenon as nothing more than phenomenon.” To achieve this goal, this text will briefly examine the notions of phenomenon in Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. For Husserl, phenomena are experiences. Experiences that are situated in the unity of the self, a unity that is in turn constituted by the “temporal flow of the living present,” that is, the internal flow of consciousness. This starting point privileges intentional experience, especially perceptual experience, as the basis of objectivity (Husserl, 2013, p. 301). On the other hand, Heidegger, in §7 of Being and Time, distinguishes between vulgar phenomenon (what appears) and phenomenological phenomenon (showing itself), differentiating it from appearance and manifestation. In this way, phenomenology, according to Heidegger, seeks to bring to the fore (phenomenalize) that which has always been implicitly and concomitantly present (vorgänig und mitgängig). Richir transforms both perspectives by giving primacy to fantasy, understood as the original act of experience, rather than perception. Furthermore, he asserts that the given never appears in its pure form, but rather intertwined with “symbolic institutions” that fix and petrify meaning. Experience, therefore, is shown to be stratified. In response to this, phenomenology must liberate the phenomenon from these determinations, descending toward the unapparent and a-subjective through a “hyperbolic” reduction. In this way, Richir reconfigures phenomenology as an exploration of anonymous processes (phenomena) of “meaning becoming” in language, expanding the horizon of the phenomenological beyond classical subjectivity. We believe that answering the question of the status of the “phenomenon as nothing more than phenomenon” will allow us to make a preliminary distinction between subjective phenomenologies (Heidegger, Husserl) and a-subjective phenomenologies (Richir). We therefore also aim to show the radical nature of Richir's approach in relation to the phenomenological tradition.
Copyright (c) 2026 Benjamín Jara Serey https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
From Sexuality to the Care of the Self: Michel Foucault’s Californian Episode and the Turn to Practices of Subjectivation
Michel Foucault’s 1975 trip to California is examined as an interpretive scene that sheds light on a broader shift in his work during the second half of the 1970s. Situated within the context of the development of The History of Sexuality, the so-called “Californian episode” helps clarify the transition from an analytics centered on the apparatuses of sexuality to a concern with subjectivation, care of the self, and technologies of the self. Drawing on a critical review of biographical sources, Foucault’s own writings, and contemporary interpretations—particularly those of Preciado, Butler, Halperin, and Eribon—it is argued that this episode should not be understood as the direct cause of Foucault’s intellectual turn, but rather as a privileged vantage point from which to grasp the conceptual reorientation that characterizes his later work. From this perspective, Foucault’s thought shifts from the study of apparatuses of power to an examination of the practices through which subjects shape their relation to themselves within historically constituted networks of knowledge and power. This approach makes it possible to reconsider the place of technologies of the self and care of the self as part of an expansion of Foucault’s analytics of power into the field of practices of subjectivation.
Copyright (c) 2026 René Araya Alarcón https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Ciencia y filosofía: una relación de amor–odio
Traducción del inglés de Gabriel Donoso Umaña Este texto fue publicado en 2020 en Foundations of Science, 25(2), 297–314. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09619-2
Copyright (c) 2025 Sebastian De Haro; Gabriel Donoso Umaña https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
De una novela a otra. Denis de Rougemont y René Girard
Traducción del francés de Andrés Moreno Saldaña Este texto fue publicado en 2019 en Études de lettres, 311, 147–162. https://doi.org/10.4000/edl.1880
Copyright (c) 2025 Benjamin Mercerat; Andrés Moreno Saldaña https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Interview with Natalia Sabater: Ethics, Imagination, and Happiness in Spinoza
Copyright (c) 2025 Andrés Contreras Díaz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
On the Concept of Truth in the Young Heidegger: a Reorientation toward Factic Life (faktisches Leben)
The question of truth in Heidegger is as suggestive as it is problematic, and its interpretation has given rise to extensive debate in contemporary scholarship. In particular, this debate has sought to determine whether the Heideggerian notion of truth can ground a theory of knowledge or a rigorous science (strenge Wissenschaft), or whether it ultimately leads to a kind of philosophical meaninglessness. Nevertheless, it becomes necessary to investigate the thesis that, in the philosopher’s early writings, truth is understood above all as a phenomenon bound to the manifestation of human life, rather than primarily as a logical-epistemic concept separated from the subject’s lived experience. Within this framework, truth is situated in the experiential and practical domain of factical life (faktisches Leben). From this perspective, the analysis focuses on Heidegger’s early period, since it is there that the core of the connection between truth and factical life is constituted. His sustained dialogue with value theory, logic, Neo-Kantianism (especially that of his teacher Rickert) and the emerging Husserlian phenomenology provides the conceptual background that makes such a connection possible. Methodologically, the early courses and writings delivered in Freiburg and Marburg between 1919 and 1926 are examined in order to reconstruct the way in which the young Heidegger characterizes truth from the standpoint of facticity and, in doing so, prepares the path toward Sein und Zeit (1927). This reconduction of the concept of truth to factical life allows for a more precise understanding of the initial architecture of Heidegger’s thought and shows how his early reflection on truth anticipates decisive developments in his later philosophical project. Thus, it becomes evident that the concept of truth already plays a decisive role in his early thinking and that its study cannot be confined solely to the period following the Kehre, that is, after Sein und Zeit in the early 1930s.
Copyright (c) 2025 Javier Mora Casanueva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
From Democracy to Infocracy: Consequences of Information Capitalism from the Perspective of Byung-Chul Han
The notion of infocracy, coined by Byung-Chul Han, provides an interpretive framework for elucidating the structural transformation of contemporary democracy. Under this new regime, dominated by information capitalism, the political, ethical, and communicative foundations of social life are profoundly reconfigured. Power no longer operates primarily through coercion, but through seduction and self-subjugation, producing an invisible form of domination that erodes the political community. From this perspective, it can be argued that informational saturation, digital immediacy, and the emotionalization of public discourse have weakened listening, reflection, and the very possibility of dialogue, giving rise to a palliative post-democracy characterized by fragmentation, dispersion, and collective exhaustion. On the basis of this diagnosis, insights from Shoshana Zuboff and Sara Ahmed are incorporated in order to expand the conceptualization of digital power and the political dimension of affects. With this aim, the paper presents Han’s proposal for a form of resistance grounded in the recovery of vita contemplativa, silence, and listening, understood as political practices oriented toward restoring attention, alterity, and the care of the common. Finally, it is argued that the revitalization of democracy in the age of infocracy requires not only a transformation of subjectivity, but also systemic and institutional struggles aimed at reconstructing the political community as a space of care, deliberation, and shared thought.
Copyright (c) 2025 Boris Saavedra Pérez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Ryle’s Unfair Criticism of Collingwood’s Notion of Understanding
In the context of 20th-century philosophical discussions on the nature of the mind, intelligence, and understanding, divergent conceptions about the explanatory status of mental phenomena have become established. Within this framework, Gilbert Ryle developed a non-intellectualist conception of understanding as a form of know-how, according to which understanding consists primarily in the possession and manifestation of capacities and dispositions that can be evaluated according to the performance of the action. From this perspective, Ryle, especially in The Concept of Mind, formulated a systematic critique of intellectualism and introspective and idealistic conceptions of action. The problem that structures the research consists of determining whether some of these criticisms can be understood as specifically directed at Collingwood's conception of historical understanding. The thesis defended argues that Ryle's notion of understanding provides the conceptual framework from which criticisms are articulated that come into direct tension with R. G. Collingwood's theory of understanding as re-experiencing past thought. To support this thesis, Ryle's conception of understanding as know-how and his critique of the intellectualist explanation of intelligent action are reconstructed, his treatment of dispositional predicates and ordinary language is analyzed, and these elements are contrasted with the epistemological and ontological commitments implicit in Collingwood's conception of historical understanding.
Copyright (c) 2025 Michel Muñoz Vargas https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Pain, Suicide, and the Understanding of Suffering: a Philosophical-Psychological Reading of Takopi no Genzai (Takopi’s Original Sin)
In recent decades, anime has become a privileged medium for exploring suffering, pain, and suicide within societies characterized by individualism, performance, and commodified emotions. In this context, Takopi no Genzai (Takopi's Original Sin) offers a radically raw depiction of physical and psychological violence, systematic abuse, and the search for familial validation, particularly as embodied in the experience of its protagonist, Shizuka. This article proposes a hermeneutic-philosophical reading with a critical-cultural and interdisciplinary perspective, primarily drawing on the thought of Schopenhauer, in dialogue with Nietzsche, Mainländer, and Cioran, to interpret the dynamics of suffering and the subjective construction of happiness and pain. Methodologically, a textual and conceptual analysis of the anime is developed, focusing on specific scenes and the formation of Shizuka's affective and familial bonds, to show how her subjectivity is constituted under logics of violence, guilt, and school abuse. From these philosophical frameworks, suffering is understood not as a mere biographical accident or an isolated clinical maladjustment, but as a constitutive dimension of existence that resists the imperatives of positivity and well-being prevalent in contemporary societies. Thus, it can be argued that Shizuka's life embodies a form of tragic subjective autonomy, where the affirmation or negation of existence is contested in tension with the emotional and symbolic frameworks through which consumer society regulates and guides positive affective experience.
Copyright (c) 2025 Marcelo Andrés Hernández Morales https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Between Indifference and Spontaneity. Brief Reflection on the Relationship between Knowledge and Freedom in the Cartesian Theory of Error
The aim of this investigation resides in the attempt to build an interpretation of Cartesian theory of error from the Fourth Meditation that is consistent with certain passages in his work, which suggest that he falls into certain contradictions prompted by his conception of freedom. First, it will be argued that, based on the distinction between the freedom of indifference and the freedom of spontaneity, Descartes adheres to a form of moral intellectualism, insofar as he considers it impossible for someone to choose the worse course of action when the better is clearly known. This position will then be contrasted with specific passages from Descartes’ correspondence with Mersenne and Mesland, where he appears to suggest that the power of our will is such that, even in the face of clear and evident reasons, it is capable of directing itself in the opposite direction. This would seem to compromise his intellectualist conception by opening the door to the phenomenon of akrasia. Finally, an argumentation will be presented that aims to show that the type of akrasia Descartes has in mind in these passages from his correspondence does not correspond to strictly akratic actions or beliefs, but rather is always cloaked in a form of self-deception. If so this is the case, then it is possible to reconcile this phenomenon with the intellectualism maintained in the Fourth Meditation.
Copyright (c) 2025 Álvaro Urrutia Soto https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
The Role of the State in Adela Cortina’s Social Liberalism: a Libertarian Critique of the State of Justice
From a libertarian perspective, this work offers a critical analysis of Adela Cortina’s proposal of the State of Justice within the framework of social liberalism. This approach seeks to harmonize principles of classical liberalism, such as negative liberty and the rule of law, with demands for distributive justice inspired by Rawls and Sen, while avoiding the paternalism of the welfare state through a civic ethic of minimal consensus and the promotion of civic solidarity. However, the resulting configuration preserves a high degree of state interventionism. Drawing on the arguments of Hayek, Nozick, de Jasay, and Huerta de Soto, both the moral legitimacy and practical effectiveness of a state charged with redistributing resources and guaranteeing material opportunities are called into question. It is argued that solidarity imposed through legal means undermines individual moral agency, that redistributive policies tend to weaken personal responsibility, and that the expansion of public power, even when ethically motivated, fosters bureaucratization, corruption, and the erosion of freedom. The text also critically examines Cortina’s openness to a global authority aimed at securing justice, highlighting its implications for the principle of subsidiarity, cultural diversity, and democratic accountability. In contrast, it is defended that a free and just society must emerge from voluntary and decentralized cooperation within a framework of uncompromising respect for individual rights.
Copyright (c) 2025 Nicolás Fuentes-Valdebenito https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Ursula K. Le Guin. El nombre del mundo es bosque. Traducido por Matilde Horne. Minotauro, 2023. ISBN: 978-84-450-1457-8
Copyright (c) 2025 Felipe Sepúlveda Barrios https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic
Traducción del inglés de Esteban Echaniz Publicado originalmente el 7 de marzo de 1968 en The Journal of Philosophy, LXV(5), 113-126.
Copyright (c) 2025 David Kellog Lewis; Esteban Echaniz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
The dispensability problem of idealizations regarding the understanding of physical phenomena
The debate about scientific understanding has been relevant in the literature of philosophy of science in the last few years. The debate arises over the basis of the received view of understanding that proposes that understanding is a kind of knowledge (Khalifa, 2017, p. 154). In this context, the problem of felicitous falsehoods is presented: inaccurate misrepresentations whose inaccuracy does not abate their epistemic function to understanding phenomena (Elgin, 2017, p. 3). Scientific practice uses idealizations to understand complex phenomena; hence, they are necessary to study the target phenomenon. Nonetheless, there are some proposals in the literature that hold that, despite this, our understanding is factive. Therefore, idealizations are problematic since understanding cannot be based on misrepresentations if understanding is a kind of knowledge. In this paper, I present three factivist replies to the problem regarding the use of idealizations. Nevertheless, these replies assume the dispensability of idealization, a problematic trait since there are cases in which the idealization involved is indispensable to understanding the phenomenon. I employ, as an example, the case of the Nuclear Shell Model used to explain the stability of magic numbers. Factivist replies reduce the idealizations' role to mere convenience; however, the NSM’s idealization cannot be reduced in that way since it is required to understand the phenomenon. The paper aims to expose the problem of assuming a priori the idealizations' dispensability, ignoring their contribution and permeability in that way.
Copyright (c) 2025 Nibaldo Lorca Améstica https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Alterity versus Coexistence in the Early Work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty
This paper examines the possibility of coexistence (Mitsein) within the framework of Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy in Being and Nothingness, engaging in a critical dialogue with the Merleau-Pontian interpretation that denies such a possibility. The research revolves around a central question: Is the fundamental relation with the other an experience of alterity or of coexistence? Against Merleau-Ponty’s thesis—which posits coexistence as an originary phenomenon and reduces the Sartrean perspective to a secondary fact—we argue that Sartre integrates the communal dimension without abandoning the ontological primacy of alterity. To this end, three conceptual axes are examined: (1) the structural function of the look in the constitution of being-for-others; (2) Merleau-Ponty’s critique, which privileges a background of coexistence over alterity; and (3) Sartre’s notion of the “we-subject” as a psychological experience of community. In this way, we show that Sartre does indeed offer a theory of coexistence, though conceived as a fragile and secondary phenomenon. This allows us to reconsider the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty opposition not as a simple incompatibility, but as two antagonistic responses to the same question: Is alterity or coexistence the originary condition of my encounter with the other?
Copyright (c) 2025 Francisca Hill Grez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Micropolitics: A Concatenation of Dispositifs
The configuration of the concept of ‘micropolitics’ in the work of Argentine psychiatrist Marcelo Pakman is fundamental to understanding his thesis, according to which it is constituted as a concatenation of dispositifs in the sense proposed by Foucault. This is of vital importance when it comes to clarifying both the philosophical lineage of the concept and its psychotherapeutic implications. Thus, it will be understood that the subject is the product of micropolitical influence while simultaneously reproducing that influence in a recursive circular movement, understood as an organized process. All of this will demonstrate that the subject is also an active agent in the constitution of micropolitics. Thus, the presentation will begin with a brief introduction to the concept of micropolitics, along with its four constitutive moments, namely: social imaginary, knowledge, power, and subject. Then, the concept of dispositifs will be explained, and finally, the micropolitical constitution of subjectivity will be presented as a recursive process.
Copyright (c) 2025 Gonzalo Andrés Correa Rivera https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Contemporary literature has highlighted various shortcomings that liberalism—in its specifically philosophical formulation—suffers from when attempting to understand its own exceptional status as a historically situated reality within modernity. Added to this is the fact that the self-understanding professed by the liberal community –i.e., the reconstruction of the tradition that is said to have shaped it over the past centuries- is deeply affected by a kind of selective memory or historical myopia. However, none of these critiques seem particularly useful for an approach that aims to be normative—that is, for an assessment that seeks to philosophically evaluate the credentials of liberalism as a justification for our so-called “liberal” institutions. If we wish to undertake such an assessment, we must connect the acknowledgment of the anomalies within liberal historical consciousness to a philosophical argument of deeper scope. In this sense, the aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to present both deficiencies as “symptoms of the same illness,” namely, the lack of historical consciousness that is constitutive of liberalism, and (ii) to suggest that both deficiencies (and, along with them, liberal anti-historicism) can be challenged—from a strictly philosophical standpoint—if we contextualize them within the framework of so-called Ideologiekritik, a philosophical “program” that possesses the minimal resources required to outline a normative critique of liberalism, understood, in this case, as an ideology.
Copyright (c) 2025 Juan Andrés Vargas Cartajena https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Jordi Maiso. Desde la vida dañada. La teoría crítica de Theodor W. Adorno. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2022. ISBN: 978-84-323-2040-8
Copyright (c) 2025 Andrés Romero Pérez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Traducción del francés de Jorge Acevedo Guerra Publicado originalmente en: Fédier, F. (1995b). Regarder Voir. Les Belles Lettres / Archimbaud.
Copyright (c) 2025 François Fédier; Jorge Acevedo Guerra https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Philautía, Self-Love, and Self-Help in Contemporary Times: Self-Love Is Not Love
The study examines the evolution of the concept of self-love in contemporary society, contrasting it with the perspectives of Aristotle and Jean-Luc Marion. Aristotle distinguishes between a virtuous self-love, aligned with virtue and the common good, and a vicious one, marked by selfishness. Marion, on the other hand, offers a radical contrast, viewing love as a saturated phenomenon that transcends the subject and is oriented towards otherness, challenging the notion of self-referential or self-love. The article highlights how modern narratives, influenced by positive psychology and self-help culture, have transformed selflove into a tool for self-satisfaction, disconnected from its ethical and communal dimension, which in turn affects human relationships and social cohesion. The research uses a hermeneutic exegetical approach to explore how both philosophical frameworks can contribute to a deeper understanding of self-love, emphasizing the need to reevaluate this concept in the context of current social dynamics.
Copyright (c) 2025 Ignacio Alarcón, Francisco Novoa-Rojas https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Kant’s spatialization of time. A bergsonian perspective
The criticism that Bergson addresses to Kant is well known, even if only superficially: Kant “spatialized” time, understood it in terms of space losing sight of real time, “durée”. Sadly, as if the validity of his criticism were self-evident, or as if its comprobation were left as some sort of exercise for the reader, Bergson never wrote a rigorous study of the Critique of Pure Reason. The only way to carry out such a comprobation must consist in an analysis of Kant’s text. Is the first Critic really guilty of “spatializing” time? If so, how and why does it do it? And what are the repercussions that stem from it? To answer these questions it turns necessary to read the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic from a Bergsonian perspective in an attempt to discover just to what extent -taking into account the arguments of Kant himself- the criticism of Bergson holds true.
Copyright (c) 2025 Juan Negrete Castañeda https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Reflexivity and Self-Knowledge in Aristotle
From ancient times to the present day, self-knowledge has been understood on the basis of a particular model of reflexivity that goes back to Aristotle’s description of the type of activity that divinity essentially carries out. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that the self-knowledge that corresponds to God is not extended, due to the self-referentiality that it involves, to human beings. Therefore, I will defend the thesis that, at least within the context of Aristotle’s philosophy, it is possible to find another model of self-knowledge that better fits the heteroreferential nature of human cognition. To that end, I will begin with some introductory considerations on the forms of reflexivity involved in each case. I will then analyze the central passages of Metaphysics and De anima in which Aristotle characterizes the kind of intellection that is proper to the being that is the object of theology as one based on the relation of identity, and then contrast them with various statements in his Ethics where otherness is highlighted as the distinctive note of human cognitive acts. From this, I will conclude by distinguishing two senses in which self-knowledge can be understood in Aristotle: either as “intellective self-knowledge” or as “relational self-knowledge”.
Copyright (c) 2025 Luciano Garófalo https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Epistemology and Relativism in Wittgenstein: A Reading of On Certainty
In the literature concerning Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, there has been extensive debate on whether his ideas endorse epistemic relativism. For this reason, it is necessary to examine to what extent his work, particularly On Certainty, upholds a relativistic stance, defined by the dependency of beliefs and their justification on a specific epistemic system. Through a review of his theses on justification, epistemic systems, and hinge beliefs, it is argued that Wittgenstein rejects absolute foundationalism and, although he acknowledges the variability and dependency of systems, does not subscribe to an equivalence between them. Ultimately, the text concludes that Wittgenstein offers a moderate epistemic relativism that dismisses the possibility of rationally resolving disagreements between incompatible systems. Nevertheless, his anti-foundationalism does not lead to radical skepticism; rather, it clarifies the effective operation of our epistemic practices, suggesting that beliefs can be justified within their own context without the need for universal validation.
Copyright (c) 2025 Sebastián Nicolás Vargas Rodríguez, Gabriel Ignacio Salas Candia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Copyright (c) 2024 Francisco Castro; Dr. Kenneth A. Taylor https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Descartes’ Demon–More Powerful and Virtuous than God?
Copyright (c) 2024 Leandro Abel Cuellar; Dr. Joshua Hall https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
The issue of space and the city in Akira by Katsuhiro Ôtomo
Copyright (c) 2024 Franco Casoni https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Theo(geo)logy. Planetary historicity and natural antiquities in the Baroque
The article aims to problematize the relationship between theology and geology in the speculative natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. In particular, the article investigates the philosophical impact of the emergence of the deep time of the Earth and the appearance of material ruins –fossils– that transformed the way of conceiving planetary historicity. Therefore, one of the contributions consists of showing how the geological revolution that took place in the Baroque transformed the metaphysics of human time by modifying the terrestrial scales: a change from thousands of years according to the biblical theory of time to billions of years from the emergence of geology. The conjecture being tested is the epistemological continuity between theology and natural science in the Seventeenth Century, as some theologians and philosophers chose as a philosophical enterprise to explain empirically some assumptions of Christian Theology, whose ultimate aim is to prove how God proceeds according to natural causes. The novelty of the article, then, is to explain the emergence of geology from the philosophical theories and theological arguments of some baroque thinkers, in particular the Anglican theologian Thomas Brunet and the German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher.
Copyright (c) 2024 Ángel Octavio Álvarez Solis https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0