The dispensability problem of idealizations regarding the understanding of physical phenomena
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53382/issn.2735-6140.115Keywords:
Scientific Understanding, Factive/Non-Factive, Factivism/Non-Factivism, Idealizations, Dispensability assumptionAbstract
The debate about scientific understanding has been relevant in the literature of philosophy of science in the last few years. The debate arises over the basis of the received view of understanding that proposes that understanding is a kind of knowledge (Khalifa, 2017, p. 154). In this context, the problem of felicitous falsehoods is presented: inaccurate misrepresentations whose inaccuracy does not abate their epistemic function to understanding phenomena (Elgin, 2017, p. 3). Scientific practice uses idealizations to understand complex phenomena; hence, they are necessary to study the target phenomenon. Nonetheless, there are some proposals in the literature that hold that, despite this, our understanding is factive. Therefore, idealizations are problematic since understanding cannot be based on misrepresentations if understanding is a kind of knowledge. In this paper, I present three factivist replies to the problem regarding the use of idealizations. Nevertheless, these replies assume the dispensability of idealization, a problematic trait since there are cases in which the idealization involved is indispensable to understanding the phenomenon. I employ, as an example, the case of the Nuclear Shell Model used to explain the stability of magic numbers. Factivist replies reduce the idealizations' role to mere convenience; however, the NSM’s idealization cannot be reduced in that way since it is required to understand the phenomenon. The paper aims to expose the problem of assuming a priori the idealizations' dispensability, ignoring their contribution and permeability in that way.
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