Epistemology and Relativism in Wittgenstein: A Reading of On Certainty

Abstract

In the literature concerning Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, there has been extensive debate on whether his ideas endorse epistemic relativism. For this reason, it is necessary to examine to what extent his work, particularly On Certainty, upholds a relativistic stance, defined by the dependency of beliefs and their justification on a specific epistemic system. Through a review of his theses on justification, epistemic systems, and hinge beliefs, it is argued that Wittgenstein rejects absolute foundationalism and, although he acknowledges the variability and dependency of systems, does not subscribe to an equivalence between them. Ultimately, the text concludes that Wittgenstein offers a moderate epistemic relativism that dismisses the possibility of rationally resolving disagreements between incompatible systems. Nevertheless, his anti-foundationalism does not lead to radical skepticism; rather, it clarifies the effective operation of our epistemic practices, suggesting that beliefs can be justified within their own context without the need for universal validation.