Between Indifference and Spontaneity. Brief Reflection on the Relationship between Knowledge and Freedom in the Cartesian Theory of Error

Abstract

The aim of this investigation resides in the attempt to build an interpretation of Cartesian theory of error from the Fourth Meditation that is consistent with certain passages in his work, which suggest that he falls into certain contradictions prompted by his conception of freedom. First, it will be argued that, based on the distinction between the freedom of indifference and the freedom of spontaneity, Descartes adheres to a form of moral intellectualism, insofar as he considers it impossible for someone to choose the worse course of action when the better is clearly known. This position will then be contrasted with specific passages from Descartes’ correspondence with Mersenne and Mesland, where he appears to suggest that the power of our will is such that, even in the face of clear and evident reasons, it is capable of directing itself in the opposite direction. This would seem to compromise his intellectualist conception by opening the door to the phenomenon of akrasia. Finally, an argumentation will be presented that aims to show that the type of akrasia Descartes has in mind in these passages from his correspondence does not correspond to strictly akratic actions or beliefs, but rather is always cloaked in a form of self-deception. If so this is the case, then it is possible to reconcile this phenomenon with the intellectualism maintained in the Fourth Meditation.