The Doctrine of Categorial Intuition: A Phenomenological Conception of Truth

Abstract

The aim of this article is to reconstruct in its key elements the doctrine of the categorial intuition included in LU VI, 6, but in its limited scope to the explanation of the conditions of possibility of the truth of apophantic statements. Reconstruction becomes peremptory because the doctrine belongs to those philosophical theories whose arguments are liable to be distorted. However, the purpose is not to investigate the reasons for which such misinterpretations are due, but rather, to warn of the consequences that could be obtained from them. I will show that, in order to answer this question, Husserl build a conceptual device that interprets the categorial intuition, belonging to the spontaneous-intellectual field of human knowledge, as psychical acts that prove what is intended in the statements, through the presentation of categorically formed object, namely, a state of affairs. intuition are founded on sensible intuition, although they are nevertheless irreducible to them. Finally, I will problematize around the genuine status that the author seems to grant to states of affairs, specially, to the categories involved in them. Moreover, I will examine in detail the founding acts-founded acts model according to which categorial.