The relevance of the soul in Aristotle’s infinity of time

Abstract

In Physics IV 14 Aristotle poses the question about the possibility of the non-existence of time without a soul to experience it. The question has led to a wide interpretative discussion of the passage, and the most widely accepted position is a reading in strictly realistic terms according to which time would have existence independently of the soul that experiences it. The aim of this investigation is to contribute to the possibility of interpreting the question of the relationship between time and the soul in phenomenological terms. In this, an attempt will be made to bring out the importance of the active concourse of the soul in the explanation of the reality of time, and particularly in the Aristotelian treatment of the infinity of time. To this end, first a brief exposition will be made of the precedents in terms of textual evidence that the realistic interpretation takes into consideration, to then make a review of the Aristotelian treatment of the infinity of time carried out in Physics IV 13, establishing a dialogue with the work done in this line by A. G. Vigo, to finally conclude that what the Aristotelian treatment of the infinity of time has to tell us about the relation between time and soul is that an explanation in merely realistic terms is not sufficient to understand a phenomenon such as time, for it is necessary to assume the indispensable role that the agency of the soul has in the understanding of the reality of time.