Aristotle and the Conceptual Unity of Friendship (φιλία) in the Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

Aristotle devotes two full books of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) to friendship (φιλία) and to the questions that have generated contrary and diverse opinions about it. Among such problems is whether friendship is one or several. Aristotle considers that there are three types of friendship: one that is founded on good or virtue, another that is based on pleasure, and the last one that refers to utility. However, the type of conceptual unity that friendship would have has been the subject of discussion among the author's commentators. In this paper, we intend to show that the type of conceptual unity that friendship has is that of the analogy that occurs based on the similarity between the types of friendship. For this purpose, in the first section, the distinction between homonymy and synonymy will be addressed, as well as the notion of unity to understand the problem. Along with this, the question of what friendship is and in how many senses it is said will be discussed. In the last section it will discuss the linking of similarity and analogy and then the use of the expression 'by resemblance' (καθ' ὁμοιότητα) to finally show how analogical unity would apply to the case of friendship.