Method according to Spinoza’s TIE: a Reconsideration of Harold Joachim’s Circularity
Keywords:
Spinoza, verdad, método, definición genética, criterio de la verdadAbstract
In this paper I aim to reconsider and develop an objection posited by Harold Joachim to the conception of method developed by Spinoza in the TIE. In particular, the circularity in which Spinoza is guilty when he determines which is the best type of perception. I will show that this objection is sound if we notice that, given that the method must start with a given true idea, the implementation of method depends on the previous best type of perception choice. And, given the priority of the definition, Spinoza can’t decide which type of perception is the best without assuming at the very beginning what is the nature of the understanding, but this knowledge is exactly what the implementation of method seeks to achieve. I will finish this paper with a distinction between two ways of understanding the implementation of method (one static and other dynamic), being just one of them open to Joachim’s objection.
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