Necessary problems of the principle I = I as a model of self-consciousness according to Hegel

Abstract

This paper proposes to analyze the reasons why Hegel claims in the Phenomenology of Spirit that the I=I model of self-consciousness is not properly self-consciousness. Unfortunately, it will be seen that the evidence of the Phenomenology proves insufficient for this task; so, it will be supplemented by an analysis of certain passages from the writing on the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's systems of philosophy insofar as a more detailed version of the foundations of the critique of that model is to be found there. The combined evidence is intended to justify that the model whose absolute principle is I=I necessarily is incapable of constituting self consciousness in the context of Phenomenology. Likewise, a stronger thesis could be arrived at, since it will be seen that these elements that are proposed as necessary fulfill the function of an unavoidable datum that any model of self-consciousness must assume if it effectively seeks to explain the relation of consciousness with itself.