The diversity of cognitive content in the aristotelian passions

Abstract

We propose to analyze in detail the discussion of whether the aristotelian passions, as presented in the Rhetoric, necessarily require belief, appearance, or some other cognitive content for their constitution. This would allow us to understand more clearly the philosopher's theory of the emotions, thereby seeking some unified criterion to explain the common basis of the passions; or, if not, to discard such an interpretative project. We will show how the problem regarding cognitive content arises from the relationship Aristotle establishes between the passions and the formation of a judgment in the general context of the Rhetoric, then we will review in detail the readings that defend each position in this regard. Our goal is to show that this debate dissolves itself, as the alleged technical differences are eliminated, or the perspectives converge by clarifying the conceptual contents and distinctions that are exogenously introduced by the interpreters. Thus, the development shows that, at least as far as Rhetoric and its philosophical function are concerned, Aristotle does not install a monolithic and unified structure of emotions.