Acts of rumoring and rumor-mongering: an analysis of rumor based on responsabilist approach in virtue epistemology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.53382/issn.2735-6140.8Keywords:
rumor, acto de rumoring, acto de rumor-mongering, motivación epistémica, akrasia epistémicaAbstract
In the following article I explore the links between virtue epistemology and epistemology of testimony by analyzing rumor as an epistemological phenomenon. To do this, in (1) I characterize the debate about the reliability of rumor and how this debate derives into a discussion about the character of the agents in the rumor exchange. In (2) I analyze the acts of rumoring and rumor-mongering based on the notion of epistemic motivation; and finally, in (3), I analyze these acts based on the notion of epistemic akrasia to propose the virtue of contingency related to rumor, arguing that virtue epistemology is useful to characterize deeply the disposition of the agents in the rumor exchange. In consequence, I defend that a precisely comprehension of rumor’s epistemic properties implies an analysis of it using the scope of responsabilist virtue epistemology.
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