Is it Possible to Make Epistemically Objective Affirmations about Art? An Analysis of This Issue in John Searle’s Philosophy of Society and the Epistemology of Disagreement

Abstract

This paper discusses the possibility of making epistemically objective statements regarding art based on John Searle’s philosophy of society and the epistemology of disagreement. To do this, the ontologically objective/subjective and epistemically objective/subjective distinctions will be considered in relation to art as an intentionality-relative phenomenon, indicating it as ontologically subjective and epistemically objective. Then will be discussed the disagreement around controversial works of art and the dissolution of such disagreements considering the opposition between belief and acceptance as proposed by Jonathan Cohen. Finally, by showing the possibility of generating agreements around aesthetic judgments, the role of institutions related to art in our understanding of the artistic status of controversial works is pointed out. As a result, it is indicated that the appreciation of a work as art is an objective matter that depends on the institutions that operate in our society.